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on the mortgage, and further, that the account not lapse into more
than one month's arrears at any future date. Failure by defendant to
satisfy these requirements would allow the plaintiff to have the mortgaged premises sold as per the judgment granted in foreclosure.
As evidenced by this decision, 148 CPLR 5240 is a valuable safeguard against judicial injustices. Attorneys should not hesitate to request its application, and judges should not refrain to use it as the
broad source of authority it is intended to be. 149
ARTICLE 55 -APPEALS

GENERALLY

CPLR 5519(a) (1): Stay protects the state from punishment for contempt.
Pursuant to CPLR 5519(a)(1), the state, its political subdivisions,
and its officers and agencies are accorded an automatic stay in any enforcement proceeding once a notice of appeal is served upon the adverse
party. 150 Such service is complete under CPLR 2103 (b)(2) the moment it
is mailed.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, held in Byrne v.
Long Island State Park Commission,15' that the state and the attorney
general were not guilty of contempt because state officials prevented
peaceful picketing in contravention of an injunction order. 5 2 Thirty
minutes after service of a copy of this order, the state mailed a notice
of appeal to the plaintiff, thereby effectively staying the injunction,
although the notice was not received until several days later. 153 Concluding that the stay foreclosed punishment for the state's activity
during this interim, 154 the court denied the defendant's request to renew the application upon proper papers. 55
148 Accord, Lee v. Community Capital Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 699, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1971).
149 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 155 (1970).
150 See 7 WK&M
5519.03.
151 67 Misc. 2d 1084, 325 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).

152 Byrne v. Long Island State Park Comm'n, 66 Misc. 2d 1070, 323 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1971).
153 67 Misc. 2d at 1086, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 149, citing Hacker v. City of New York, 25 App.
Div. 2d 35, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 26 App. Div. 2d 400, 275
N.Y.S.2d 146 (Ist Dep't 1966), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 722, 229 N.E.2d 613, 283 N.Y.S.2d 46, cert.
denied, 390 US. 1036 (1967).
154 67 Misc. 2d at 1086, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 149-50. The court cited Union Free School
Dist. No. 7 v. Allen, 30 App. Div. 2d 629, 290 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671 (3d Dep't 1968), where it
was held that a stay was itself suspended while an appeal by the Commissioner of Education was pending.
155 Plaintiff had proceeded by notice of motion rather than by order to show cause or
by warrant of attachment, as required by statute (N.Y. JUDIcARY LAw § 757 (McKinney
1968)). 67 Misc. 2d at 1085, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 148. There is disagreement as to whether this
defect is jurisdictional in nature or a mere irregularity. Compare, eg., Johnson v. Ackerman, 192 App. Div. 890, 181 N.Y.S. 772 (2d Dep't 1920) with, e.g., Maigille v. Leonard,
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Whatever the relative merits of CPLR 5519(a)(1),
tion in Byrne is clearly correct.

56

its applica-

ARTICLE 71- RECOvERY OF CHATTEL

CPLR 7102: Replevin statute upheld against constitutional attack.
The New York replevin law, article 71 of the CPLR, amended in
response to Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,157 has recently been
the subject of careful judicial scrutiny. Thus far, the statute has withstood the constitutional challenges which have been levied against it,
including the procedural due process argument made in General
Electric Credit Corp. v. Fred Pistone, Jr., Inc.6 8 The plaintiff therein
was the vendor's assignee of a conditional sales agreement. Title to
the goods, heavy duty equipment, was to remain in the plaintiff until
full payment was made. When the defendant fell behind in his payments, the plaintiff notified him of his default and ordered him to
return the equipment. Upon the defendant's failure to comply, the
creditor obtained an order of seizure under GPLR 7102. When confronted with this order by the sheriff, the debtor refused to surrender
the goods or to state their location.
In the ensuing contempt proceeding, the defendant, relying on
Laprease, contended that the order of seizure should be vacated because the statute was unconstitutional as a denial of procedural due
process. Rejecting this argument, the court declared that by amending
CPLR article 71 the Legislature had remedied its constitutional deficiencies. Under the deficient statute, a creditor could obtain a "prejudgment seizure without even an ex parte order of a judge or
court.... "159 The creditor would deliver to the sheriff an affidavit, a
requisition, and an undertaking, and the sheriff could then seize the
160
property.
The new CPLR 7102 eradicate[d] the "requisition" procedure, substituting in its place an "order of seizure". This interposes a neu102 App. Div. 367, 92 N.Y.S. 656 (2d Dep't), affd, 181 N.Y. 558, 74 N.E. 1120 (1905). The

state's timely assertion of this defect permitted the court to avoid this issue. 67 Misc. 2d
at 1085, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
Ir6 The characterization of CPLR 5519 as "most unfortunate" (7 WK&M
5519.03)
has been approved by the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Union Free School
Dist. No. 7 v. Alien, 30 App. Div. 2d 629, 290 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671 (3d Dep't 1968).
157 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
158 68 Misc. 2d 475, 326 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1971).

U91d. at 479, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 902, citing Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315
F. Supp. 716, 725 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
160 Former CPIk 7102(a). For a further discussion of the former replevin practice, see
H. WCcrrLL, Nmv YoRK PRACrcE UNDER THE CPLR 221 (3d ed. 1970); Comment, Laprease
and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 886, 888 (1971).

